Four charts and a finding are not an answer. Today we turn them into the one page that goes to the board.
| Level | Sounds like | Reader does |
|---|---|---|
| Description | “37.71% of bookings fail.” | Nods. Nothing changes. |
| Diagnosis | “Most failures are supply-side, peaking at 17:00.” | Finds it interesting. Nothing changes. |
| Recommendation | “Run an incentive at 16:30β17:30 in three hubs. Costs βΉX, recovers βΉY, we know in three weeks.” | Decides. |
| Outcome | Bookings | Share | Who can fix it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cancelled by Driver | 2,698 | 17.99% | Supply team |
| No Driver Found | 1,036 | 6.91% | Supply team |
| Cancelled by Customer | 1,022 | 6.81% | Product |
| Incomplete | 901 | 6.01% | Operations |
3,734 bookings β nearly four times the customer-cancellation rate.
“37.71% fail” belongs to nobody. “A quarter fail on the supply side” names a department and a budget.
| Driver reason | Count | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Customer related issue | 729 | 27.02% |
| More than permitted people in there | 666 | 24.68% |
| Personal & Car related issues | 652 | 24.17% |
| The customer was coughing/sick | 651 | 24.13% |
Causes really are evenly spread β so any single fix addresses at most a quarter. Say so before someone budgets for a silver bullet.
Three of four blame the customer. Drivers pick from a dropdown under time pressure; the lowest-penalty option wins. This is a measurement artefact.
| Customer reason | Count | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Driver is not moving towards pickup location | 211 | 20.65% |
| AC is not working | 210 | 20.55% |
| Driver asked to cancel | 208 | 20.35% |
| Change of plans | 203 | 19.86% |
| Wrong Address | 190 | 18.59% |
The driver did not want the trip, asked the passenger to cancel so the penalty fell on them, and the data now calls it a customer cancellation. Add the 211 “not moving towards pickup” and ~419 of 1,022 (41%) are plausibly driver-initiated.
Fair β it is exactly what catches 03:00 (43.48% on 46 bookings). But 17:00 carries 1,062. Stable to a fraction of a point.
Survives.
2.78 points β a 7.5% relative increase. About 30 extra failed trips in that hour, ~βΉ7,000 of fares. Material over a year, modest in one hour.
Partially survives β target a window, not a point.
If 17:00 carries more airport trips, and airport trips fail more, the hour is innocent. Segment 17:00 by vehicle type and pickup, compare to the daily mix. Same mix + different rate β time is the driver.
If driver log-ins showed the same active supply at 16:00β17:00 as at 18:00, repositioning collapses. We do not have that data β and saying so names exactly which dataset resolves it.
One anomalous hour is a curiosity. Two consecutive elevated hours immediately before the peak is a mechanism: drivers have not yet repositioned for the evening rush.
| Pickup location | Bookings | Cancelled | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Noida Sector 62 | 1,209 | 405 | 33.50% |
| Indira Gandhi International Airport | 1,183 | 388 | 32.80% |
| New Delhi Railway Station | 1,179 | 391 | 33.16% |
| Gurgaon Cyber City | 1,178 | 368 | 31.24% |
| Connaught Place | 1,139 | 374 | 32.84% |
Cancellation rates across the top five hubs span 31.24% to 33.50% β barely two points. There is no catastrophic location.
The problem is systemic, not local. A fix aimed at “the bad hub” cannot work, because there is no bad hub.
The intervention must be time-based and system-wide, concentrated where volume already is. The chart that looked boring did real work.
| # | Beat | Content |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | The stake | 37.71% fail; up to βΉ13.3 lakh at risk |
| 2 | The narrowing | ~25% fail on the supply side β it has an owner |
| 3 | The mechanism | Peaks at 16:00β17:00, before the demand peak |
| 4 | The target | Five hubs, 39% of demand, uniform rates |
| 5 | The action | One costed recommendation with a date |
| 6 | The limits | What this cannot establish, and what would |
The stake. The status donut frames everything that follows.
The mechanism. The 16:00β18:00 failure curve.
Supporting detail β revenue by product, cancellation reasons.
Never put your key finding here.
5,657 of 15,000 bookings (37.71%) carried no passenger, against βΉ22.0 lakh realised. At βΉ235.73 average fare that is up to βΉ13.3 lakh forgone β an upper bound, since some customers rebooked.
At least 24.89% of all bookings (3,734) fail on the supply side. A further 419 customer cancellations cite “driver asked to cancel” or “driver not moving”, pushing the share toward 27.6%.
Failure peaks at 16:00 (40.45%) and 17:00 (39.92%), above the 18:00 peak's 37.14% despite 18:00 carrying more bookings. Supply lags demand by one to two hours.
Pilot a time-boxed driver incentive, 16:00β18:00, at the five highest-volume hubs (39% of demand). Size it below βΉ235.73 so the economics hold at any recovery rate above break-even.
Closing the 16:00β17:00 gap to the 18:00 baseline recovers ~60 trips/day across the two hours β roughly βΉ14,000 daily, βΉ51 lakh annualised, before incentive cost.
Compare pilot vs non-pilot hubs over three weeks. If the gap does not close by at least one percentage point, the explanation is wrong and we stop.
| Gap | Weak | Strong |
|---|---|---|
| No driver supply data | “More data would help.” | “Driver log-in timestamps would confirm or kill this in a day.” |
| Unreliable reason codes | “Reasons are unclear.” | “Three of four blame the customer in near-equal shares β consistent with penalty-avoidance.” |
| βΉ13.3 lakh estimate | “Approximate.” | “Upper bound assuming no rebooking. The conclusion holds even if it is half.” |
| Correlation only | “Causation unproven.” | “The pilot is the experiment. That is why we test on a subset.” |
Add the pickup chart and the customer-reason chart. Verify the 208 yourself. Run the composition check. Re-sequence into the six beats. Retitle every chart as a question.
Write your own one-page memo. You may well disagree with the incentive pilot β a well-argued alternative scores higher than a copy.
Then hand it to a classmate and ask for the weakest number on the page. Whatever they find is what the marker will find.